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Abstract: We suggest an alternative explanation for the emergence of Big Gods that 
places less emphasis on the role of cognitive tendencies and selection of prosocial 
cultural variants. Instead, we argue that the fundamental motivation to reduce 
uncertainty and increase long-term predictability provides a better account for the 
rise of Big moralizing Gods in a complex and heavily regulated social environment.  
Norenzayan et al.’s account of the role of Big Gods in promoting large-scale 
cooperation is powerful – so powerful, in fact, that it is almost too forceful. The 
combination of ethnographic, historic, and experimental evidence to support their 
argument makes the whole intellectual enterprise look so neat that there is a certain 
un- reality to it – we could say that it is almost too neat to be true. We will structure 
our comment in the following way: First, we question the accuracy of their 
examination of disbelief; second, we propose an alternative motivational framework 
to explain the transition from small to Big Gods.  
The evolution of humanity’s beliefs about gods is a far messier affair than the 
authors convey. They explain the occurrence of dis- belief or atheism as a result of 
the emergence and spread of modern secular institutions that promoted public trust 
and existential security, thus replacing the role of moralizing Big Gods. This is a 
rather idiosyncratic and biased reading of the historical evidence. Long before the 
rise of modern secularity there were organized forms of disbelief, which go back to 
the sixth century BCE. In India, the philosophical school known as Lokayatas 
(meaning “the worldly ones”) proposed a purely material nature of the world and 
rejected the existence of the soul and of karma (Frazier 2013). In South America, 
there are small societies without myths of creation or belief in gods, big or small 
(Everett 2008). And in Europe, long before the age of industrialization, schools of 
Epicurean philosophy have actively challenged beliefs in the supernatural and 
proposed solely naturalistic explanations of the origins of the world (Wilson 2008).  
Lack of supernatural belief in human societies is not as exceptional as Norenzayan et 
al. argue. And secular institutions, for all their security and cooperative potential, 
cannot explain the preindustrial existence of organized forms of disbelief. We are 
missing a link in this evolutionary account of religion – but there is some- thing else 
we are missing. The target article seems to evade the question that is begging to be 
answered: Why would anyone want to believe in Big (rather than small) Gods? We 
suggest that we will find the answer not in the cognitive tendencies (such as 
mentalizing) the authors enumerate in their article but in fundamental motivations 
to seek order and to avoid uncertainty.  
Recent studies have confirmed long-held intuitions that belief in gods is rooted in 
the motivations to feel in control (Kay et al. 2009) and to alleviate fear or stress (Ano 
& Vasconcelles 2005). We can further unpack these motivations following Friston’s 
(2010) account of how the organism seeks equilibrium with its environment. In order 
to find an optimal state, we will attempt to reduce uncertainty in the environment to 
maintain homeostasis, minimize disorder, and increase long-term predictability. By 
generating certain beliefs about the ultimate structure and meaning of the world 
and acting according to these beliefs, one can sustain a manageable level of 
experienced uncertainty. In the case of religion, the search for optimization can take 
an active form, such as engaging with a ritual to align with or seek benefits from the 
gods, or a passive form that allows you to adapt to the environment (e.g., by making 
attributions about the cause of events: “the gods willed this to happen” or “it is my 
karma”).  
But how is this relevant to understanding the transition from small gods to Big Gods? 
Living in large communities comes with many advantages but also places the 
individual in a somewhat paradoxical position. The structural complexity of larger 
communities requires the individual to relinquish control over the surroundings, 
with social conventions limiting personal behavioral repertoire. In other words, to 
enjoy the benefits of living in a more stable and less threatening environment, one 
renounces a greater freedom over one’s actions. The emergence of these new social 
restrictions on behavior gives rise to different kinds of uncertainties, which directly 
extend into the religious realm – more complex communities create special places to 
access the gods (temples) and an elite of religious experts (priests), thus distancing 
individuals from smaller gods. In order to reduce the un- certainty in this more 
complex and restrictive social environment to an optimal level, one possibility is to 
modify internal belief systems. Big Gods, we would argue, emerged in increasingly 
complex societies driven by a motivation toward optimization of long-term 
predictability in a more regulated and restrictive environment.  
The belief in Big Gods that reward and punish behaviors in- creases the long-term 
predictability of the environment and the perception of control. Big societies make 
the environment predictable by allocating the excess uncertainty resulting from the 
lack of direct influence on all events/outcomes to an external powerful agent. By 
doing so collectively, they achieve homeostasis and reduce uncertainty to an optimal 
and psychologically manageable level. Therefore, by believing in Big Gods that 
reward good deeds and punish bad actions, believers create an external 
“placeholder” for the excessive cognitive uncertainty caused by a reduced control 
over the environment when living in very large and complex communities. In 
contrast, the less complicated social structure in smaller societies offers individuals a 
greater influence over the events and outcomes affecting them. This influence 
allows them to act on reducing uncertainty without needing very powerful, 
moralizing Big Gods to gain an optimal sense of control.  
At the beginning of this commentary, we noted that Norenzayan et al.’s account of 
disbelief as the outcome of modern, secular structures was inaccurate. According to 
the motivational principle we have described, you do not need secular structures to 
explain disbelief. Big Gods do not quite disappear; more often, they are replaced by 
other Big ideas such as faith in human progress or in science, which, according to 
recent experimental evidence, allow nonreligious individuals to reduce uncertainty 
about their environment, find order, and alleviate feelings of stress and anxiety 
(Farias et al. 2013; Rutjens et al. 2013).  
 
References 
Ano, G. G. & Vasconcelles, E. B. (2005) Religious coping and psychological 
adjustment to stress: A meta-analysis. Journal of Clinical Psychology 61(4):461–80. 
doi: 10.1002/jclp.20049.  
Farias, M., Newheiser, A., Kahane, G. & de Toledo, Z. (2013) Scientific faith: Belief in 
science increases in the face of stress and anxiety. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology 49(6):1210–13. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2013.05.008.  
Everett, D. (2008) Don’t sleep, there are snakes: Life and language in the Amazonian 
jungle. Profile.  
Frazier, J. (2013) Hinduism. In: The Oxford Handbook of Atheism, ed. S. Bullivant &  
M. Ruse, pp. 367–79. Oxford University Press. 
Friston, K. (2010) The free-energy principle: A unified brain theory? Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience 11(2):127–38. doi: 10.1038/nrn2787.  
Kay, A. C., Whitson, J. A., Gaucher, D. & Galinsky, A. D. (2009) Compensatory control: 
Achieving order through the mind, our institutions, and the heavens. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science 18:264–68. doi: 10.1111/j.1467- 
8721.2009.01649.x.  
Rutjens, B., van Harreveld, F. & van der Pligt, J. (2013) Step by step: Finding 
compensatory order in science. Current Directions in Psychological Science 22 
(3):250–55. doi: 10.1177/0963721412469810.   
Wilson, C. (2008) Epicureanism at the origins of modernity. Oxford University Press. 
 
